Home  ›  Gregonis V. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 Ny 152 - 1923

Gregonis V. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 Ny 152 - 1923

Written By Monday, March 7, 2022 Add Comment Edit
Supreme Court of the United States
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Term: 2020
Of import Dates
Argument: November 4, 2020
Decided: June 17, 2021
Outcome
Reversed and remanded
Vote
ix-0
Majority
Chief Justice John Thou. Roberts • Stephen Breyer • Sonia Sotomayor • Elena Kagan • Brett Kavanaugh • Amy Coney Barrett
Concurring
Amy Coney Barrett • Samuel Alito (in judgment) • Neil Gorsuch (in judgment) • Clarence Thomas (in judgment)

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania was a instance argued before the Supreme Court of the United States on November 4, 2020, during the court's Oct 2020-2021 term.

In a unanimous ruling, the court reversed the decision of the United States Courtroom of Appeals for the tertiary Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the City of Philadelphia violated Catholic Social Service'due south (CSS) right to complimentary exercise nether the First Amendment past excluding CSS from the foster care plan due to CSS'due south refusal to certify same-sex couples. Principal Justice John Yard. Roberts delivered the majority opinion of the court. Justice Amy Coney Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch filed opinions concurring in the judgment only, of which Justice Clarence Thomas joined.[1]

HIGHLIGHTS

  • The case: In 2018, the city of Philadelphia'due south Section of Human Services began an investigation into 2 of its foster care provider agents for potential violations of the city'due south anti-bigotry laws. The investigation was based on an allegation that the agencies refused to piece of work with aforementioned-sex couples seeking to become foster parents. One of the agencies was a religious nonprofit system, Catholic Social Services ("CSS"). CSS confirmed that it would not certify aforementioned-sexual practice couples as foster parents. The metropolis stopped referring foster children to the bureau. CSS filed suit against the city in district court, citing violations of its rights under the First Amendment and under Pennsylvania's Religious Freedom Protection Act. The district court denied the request. CSS appealed to the 3rd Circuit, seeking emergency injunctive relief awaiting entreatment. The circuit court denied the asking. Then, CSS filed an emergency application to the Supreme Court for an injunction pending entreatment or an immediate grant of certiorari. The Court denied the request. On appeal, the third Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.

  • The effect: The case concerned the Free Practice Clause of the First Amendment.

  • The questions presented:
    "(1) Whether free practice plaintiffs can only succeed by proving a particular type of discrimination claim–namely that the government would allow the aforementioned conduct past someone who held different religious views–equally two circuits have held, or whether courts must consider other bear witness that a law is not neutral and more often than not applicable, equally six circuits have held?
    "(2) Whether Employment Sectionalisation v. Smith should be revisited?
    "(three) Whether a government violates the Starting time Amendment past conditioning a religious agency's ability to participate in the foster care system on taking deportment and making statements that directly contradict the agency'south religious beliefs?"[two]

  • The outcome: In a unanimous ruling, the court reversed the decision of the Us Court of Appeals for the tertiary Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings, property that the Urban center of Philadelphia violated Catholic Social Service'south (CSS) right to gratis exercise under the Starting time Amendment by excluding CSS from the foster care programme due to CSS's refusal to certify same-sex couples.[one]


    • The case came on a writ of certiorari to the Usa Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit.[3] You tin can review the lower court's opinion hither.[4]

    Timeline

    The following timeline details fundamental events in this case:

    • June 17, 2021: The U.S. Supreme Courtroom reversed the decision of the 3rd Circuit and remanded the example for further proceedings.
    • November 4, 2020: Oral argument was heard.
    • February 24, 2020: The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
    • July 22, 2019: Sharonell Fulton filed a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court.
    • April 22, 2019: The 3rd Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Commune of Pennsylvania'due south ruling.

    Background

    Procedural background

    Every bit of the start of the litigation, the city of Philadelphia's Department of Human being Services ("Human Services") had 1-year contracts with 30 agencies in its foster care system. Ane of the agencies was Catholic Social Services ("CSS"), a religious nonprofit organisation affiliated with the Archdiocese of Philadelphia. On March 9, 2018, a reporter from the Philadelphia Inquirer contacted Human Services stating that CSS and another agency with agile contracts in the city'south foster intendance system would not piece of work with same-sex activity couples seeking to go foster parents. Human Services considered the claim to be a potential violation of Philadelphia'south anti-bigotry laws and began investigating the allegation. The contract between the city and CSS included language prohibiting agencies from discriminating due to race, colour, religion, or nation of origin, and information technology included the city'south Fair Practices Ordinance, which in function prohibits sexual orientation bigotry in public accommodations, or in public or private facilities used past the public.[v] The two agencies in question confirmed to Human being Services that they would not work with aforementioned-sex couples due to their religious views on matrimony. Man Services stopped referring foster children to the agencies.[four]

    Later in 2018, CSS filed adapt in district court, claiming that Philadelphia violated the bureau's First Amendment rights and its rights nether Pennsylvania'south Religious Freedom Protection Human action.[6] Three individuals who had worked with CSS as foster parents—Sharonell Fulton, Cecilia Paul, and Toni Lynn Simms-Busch—were also listed as plaintiffs.[4] [7] CSS argued that it cannot certify a same-sexual practice married couple as foster parents in keeping with its religious views and as an affiliate of the Cosmic Church building. Country regulations required CSS, acting in its chapters every bit a foster care provider, to consider an applicant's existing family relationships during the certification process. CSS applied this requirement by only certifying foster parents who were either married or single. CSS would not certify cohabitating unmarried couples and considered all same-sex couples to be unmarried. CSS sought preliminary injunctive relief from the district court to the issue that the city of Philadelphia exist required to renew its contractual relationship with CSS while allowing CSS to refuse same-sex activity couples who applied to exist foster parents.[eight] The commune court denied the request.[four]

    CSS appealed the conclusion to the third Excursion, seeking emergency injunctive relief pending entreatment. The tertiary Circuit denied the motility. The plaintiffs, then appellants, filed an emergency application to the Supreme Courtroom of the United States for an injunction pending appeal or an firsthand grant of certiorari . Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito referred the application to the full court. The Supreme Court denied the application.[iv]

    On appeal, the 3rd Circuit concluded that CSS was non entitled to a preliminary injunction and that Philadelphia's non-bigotry policy was "a neutral, generally applicative law, and the religious views of CSS do not entitle it to an exception from that policy. ... It has failed to make a persuasive showing that the Metropolis targeted information technology for its religious behavior, or is motivated by ill volition against its faith, rather than sincere opposition to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation."[four] The 3rd Circuit affirmed the Eastern Commune of Pennsylvania's ruling.[4]

    Case police background

    Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon five. Smith

    One of the questions presented to the court in Fulton five. Metropolis of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania was whether the case Employment Partitioning 5. Smith ought to be revisited by the Supreme Court.[ix] The following details virtually the latter case are included to provide background data.[nine] [10]

    HIGHLIGHTS

  • Petitioner: Employment Division, Section of Human Resources of Oregon

  • Respondent: Alfred Smith, et al.

  • Lower court: Oregon Supreme Court

  • The case: Alfred Smith and Galen Blackness were counselors working for a private drug rehabilitation organization and members of the Native American Church. The counselors ingested the hallucinogen peyote as role of their religious practice. The rehabilitation organization terminated the counselors' employment for misconduct equally a result of their use of peyote. Blackness and Smith then filed for unemployment compensation. The government denied their requests for benefits on the basis that their employment was terminated due to work-related misconduct. The state appellate court reversed the regime'southward decision, holding that the denial of benefits violated the counselors' First Amendment right to practise their religion freely. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the country supreme court's ruling and remanded the case. On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that while state constabulary prohibited the consumption of illegal drugs for sacramental religious uses, this prohibition violated the Costless Practice Clause. The instance returned to the U.S. Supreme Court following the state supreme courtroom's ruling.[nine] [10]

  • The issue: "Can a country deny unemployment benefits to a worker fired for using illegal drugs for religious purposes?"[ix]

  • Argued: November vi, 1989

  • Decided: The Rehnquist Court, April 17, 1990

  • The consequence: In a 6-3 vote, the Supreme Court held that the Gratis Exercise Clause permits the country to prohibit the utilize of peyote as a sacrament and thus to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the majority in delivering the opinion of the courtroom.[9] [x]

    • Questions presented

    The petitioner presented the following questions to the courtroom:[two]

    Questions presented:
    "

    (1) Whether free exercise plaintiffs can just succeed by proving a particular blazon of bigotry merits-namely that the regime would allow the same conduct by someone who held different religious views-as 2 circuits take held, or whether courts must consider other prove that a police force is not neutral and generally applicable, as six circuits have held?
    (2) Whether Employment Division v. Smith should be revisited?
    (iii) Whether a government violates the Kickoff Subpoena past conditioning a religious agency's ability to participate in the foster care system on taking actions and making statements that directly contradict the agency's religious beliefs?[11]

    		"

    Oral argument

    Sound

    Sound of oral argument:[12]

    Transcript

    Issue

    In a unanimous ruling, the court reversed the decision of the U.s.a. Courtroom of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit and remanded the example for farther proceedings, holding that the City of Philadelphia violated Cosmic Social Service's (CSS) right to free exercise nether the Commencement Amendment by excluding CSS from the foster care program due to CSS'south refusal to certify same-sex couples. Chief Justice John G. Roberts delivered the majority opinion of the court. Justice Amy Coney Barrett filed a concurring stance. Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch filed opinions concurring in the judgment only, of which Justice Clarence Thomas joined.[1]

    Opinion

    In the courtroom's bulk stance, Principal Justice John M. Roberts wrote:[ane]

    " Catholic Social Services is a foster care agency in Philadelphia. The City stopped referring children to CSS upon discovering that the agency would not certify same-sex couples to be foster parents due to its religious beliefs about marriage. The Metropolis will renew its foster intendance contract with CSS only if the agency agrees to certify same-sex couples. The question presented is whether the deportment of Philadelphia violate the First Amendment.

    ...
    The religious views of CSS inform its piece of work in this organization. CSS believes that "spousal relationship is a sacred bond between a human and a woman." App. 171. Because the agency understands the certification of prospective foster families to be an endorsement of their relationships, it will not certify unmarried couples—regardless of their sexual orientation—or same-sex married couples. CSS does non object to certifying gay or lesbian individuals as single foster parents or to placing gay and lesbian children. No same-sex couple has ever sought certification from CSS. If 1 did, CSS would direct the couple to one of the more 20 other agencies in the City, all of which currently certify same-sex couples. For over 50 years, CSS successfully contracted with the City to provide foster care services while property to these behavior.
    ....
    The Complimentary Practise Clause of the Beginning Amendment, applicable to us under the Fourteenth Subpoena, provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free practise" of religion. As an initial matter, it is plain that the City's actions have encumbered CSS'due south religious exercise by putting it to the choice of curtailing its mission or approval relationships inconsistent with its beliefs. The City disagrees. In its view, certification reflects only that foster parents satisfy the statutory criteria, non that the agency endorses their relationships. Only CSS believes that certification is tantamount to endorsement. And "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit Get-go Amendment protection." Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707, 714 (1981). Our task is to decide whether the burden the City has placed on the religious exercise of CSS is constitutionally permissible.

    Smith held that laws incidentally burdening faith are normally non subject to strict scrutiny under the Free Practise Clause and then long every bit they are neutral and more often than not applicable. 494 U. S., at 878–882. CSS urges us to overrule Smith, and the concurrences in the judgment argue in favor of doing so, see post, p. 1 (stance of ALITO, J.); post, p. i (opinion of GORSUCH, J.). But we need not revisit that decision here. This case falls outside Smith because the Urban center has burdened the religious practice of CSS through policies that practice not meet the requirement of being neutral and generally applicable. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 531–532 (1993).
    ...
    As Philadelphia acknowledges, CSS has "long been a point of light in the City'south foster-intendance arrangement." Cursory for City Respondents i. CSS seeks only an accommodation that will let information technology to proceed serving the children of Philadelphia in a manner consistent with its religious behavior; it does not seek to impose those behavior on anyone else. The refusal of Philadelphia to contract with CSS for the provision of foster care services unless it agrees to certify same-sex couples as foster parents cannot survive strict scrutiny, and violates the First Amendment.

    In view of our conclusion that the deportment of the Metropolis violate the Complimentary Exercise Clause, we need not consider whether they also violate the Free Speech Clause. The judgment of the Usa Court of Appeals for the Third Excursion is reversed, and the case is remanded for farther proceedings consequent with this stance. [xi]

    		"
    —Master Justice John G. Roberts

    Concurring

    Justice Amy Coney Barrett filed a concurring opinion, joined in full by Justice Brett Kavanaugh and joined in all but the start paragraph by Justice Stephen Breyer.[ane]

    In her concurring opinion, Barrett wrote:

    " In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), this Court held that a neutral and mostly applicable law typically does non violate the Free Exercise Clause—no matter how severely that constabulary burdens religious exercise. Petitioners, their amici, scholars, and Justices of this Court have fabricated serious arguments that Smith ought to be overruled. While history looms large in this argue, I find the historical record more silent than supportive on the question whether the founding generation understood the Get-go Amendment to crave religious exemptions from generally applicative laws in at least some circumstances. In my view, the textual and structural arguments against Smith are more than compelling. Every bit a affair of text and structure, it is difficult to meet why the Costless Exercise Clause—lonely among the First Amendment freedoms—offers nix more than protection from discrimination.

    Yet what should supervene upon Smith? The prevailing assumption seems to be that strict scrutiny would apply whenever a neutral and generally applicable law burdens religious practice. But I am skeptical about swapping Smith's categorical antidiscrimination arroyo for an equally categorical strict scrutiny government, particularly when this Courtroom's resolution of conflicts between by and large applicable laws and other Offset Subpoena rights—like speech communication and assembly—has been much more nuanced. There would be a number of issues to work through if Smith were overruled. To proper noun a few: Should entities similar Cosmic Social Services— which is an arm of the Cosmic Church building—be treated differently than individuals? Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. 171 (2012). Should there be a stardom betwixt indirect and direct burdens on religious practise? Cf. Braunfeld v. Dark-brown, 366 U. S. 599, 606–607 (1961) (plurality opinion). What forms of scrutiny should utilise? Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 403 (1963) (assessing whether government'south involvement is "'compelling'"), with Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437, 462 (1971) (assessing whether government's involvement is "substantial"). And if the answer is strict scrutiny, would pre-Smith cases rejecting free exercise challenges to garden-diversity laws come out the same style? See Smith, 494 U. S., at 888–889.

    We demand not wrestle with these questions in this instance, though, because the same standard applies regardless whether Smith stays or goes. A longstanding tenet of our gratuitous practice jurisprudence—one that both pre-dates and survives Smith—is that a police force burdening religious exercise must satisfy strict scrutiny if information technology gives authorities officials discretion to grant individualized exemptions. Come across id., at 884 (constabulary not generally applicable "where the State has in place a organisation of individual exemptions" (citing Sherbert, 374 U. Southward., at 401, n. 4)); come across also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303–307 (1940) (subjecting statute to heightened scrutiny considering exemptions lay in discretion of regime official). As the Courtroom's opinion today explains, the authorities contract at issue provides for individualized exemptions from its nondiscrimination rule, thus triggering strict scrutiny. And all ix Justices hold that the City cannot satisfy strict scrutiny. I therefore see no reason to decide in this case whether Smith should exist overruled, much less what should replace it. I join the Court'south opinion in full. [xi]

    		"
    —Justice Amy Coney Barrett

    Concurring

    Justice Samuel Alito filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch.[1]

    In his concurring stance, Alito wrote:

    " This case presents an important ramble question that urgently calls out for review: whether this Court's governing interpretation of a bedrock ramble right, the right to the free practise of faith, is fundamentally wrong and should be corrected.

    In Employment Div., Dept. of Human being Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), the Court abruptly pushed bated nearly forty years of precedent and held that the Start Subpoena's Gratuitous Exercise Clause tolerates whatsoever rule that categorically prohibits or commands specified conduct so long equally it does not target religious practice. Even if a rule serves no important purpose and has a devastating upshot on religious freedom, the Constitution, co-ordinate to Smith, provides no protection. This severe holding is ripe for reexamination.

    At that place is no question that Smith'south interpretation can accept startling consequences. Here are a few examples. Suppose that the Volstead Act, which implemented the Prohibition Amendment, had not contained an exception for sacramental vino. See Pub. L. 66, §3, 41 Stat. 308–309. The Deed would have been consequent with Smith even though it would have prevented the commemoration of a Cosmic Mass anywhere in the The states. Or suppose that a State, following the case of several European countries, made information technology unlawful to slaughter an animal that had non beginning been rendered unconscious. That law would be fine under Smith even though it would outlaw kosher and halal slaughter. Or suppose that a jurisdiction in this country, following the recommendations of medical associations in Europe, banned the circumcision of infants. A San Francisco election initiative in 2010 proposed just that. A categorical ban would be immune by Smith even though it would prohibit an aboriginal and important Jewish and Muslim practice. Or suppose that this Courtroom or some other courtroom enforced a rigid dominion prohibiting attorneys from wearing whatsoever form of head covering in courtroom. The dominion would satisfy Smith fifty-fifty though it would prevent Orthodox Jewish men, Sikh men, and many Muslim women from actualization. Many other examples could be added.

    We may hope that legislators and others with rulemaking authority volition non go as far every bit Smith allows, but the present example shows that the dangers posed past Smith are non hypothetical. The city of Philadelphia (Urban center) has issued an ultimatum to an arm of the Catholic Church: Either appoint in conduct that the Church views as contrary to the traditional Christian understanding of matrimony or abandon a mission that dates back to the earliest days of the Church—providing for the care of orphaned and abandoned children.
    ...
    We should reconsider Smith without farther filibuster. The correct interpretation of the Free Do Clause is a question of cracking importance, and Smith'south interpretation is hard to defend. Information technology tin can't be squared with the ordinary meaning of the text of the Costless Exercise Clause or with the prevalent understanding of the scope of the free-practise correct at the time of the Get-go Amendment'south adoption. It swept aside decades of established precedent, and it has not aged well. Its estimation has been undermined by subsequent scholarship on the original meaning of the Gratuitous Exercise Clause. Contrary to what many initially expected, Smith has not provided a clear-cut dominion that is piece of cake to employ, and feel has disproved the Smith majority's fear that retention of the Court's prior free-do jurisprudence would lead to "anarchy." 494 U. Due south., at 888.
    ...
    For all these reasons [set out higher up], I would overrule Smith and contrary the conclusion below. Philadelphia'southward exclusion of CSS from foster care piece of work violates the Free Exercise Clause, and CSS is therefore entitled to an injunction barring Philadelphia from taking such action. After receiving more than 2,500 pages of briefing and subsequently more than a half-year of post-argument cogitation, the Court has emitted a wisp of a determination that leaves religious liberty in a confused and vulnerable state. Those who count on this Court to stand upward for the First Amendment have every right to be disappointed—every bit am I. [11]

    		"
    —Justice Samuel Alito

    Concurring

    Justice Neil Gorsuch filed an stance concurring in the judgment, joined by Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito.[1]

    In his concurring opinion, Gorsuch wrote:

    " The Court granted certiorari to decide whether to overrule Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resource of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990). As JUSTICE ALITO'southward opinion

    demonstrates, Smith failed to respect this Court'southward precedents, was mistaken as a matter of the Constitution's original public meaning, and has proven unworkable in practice. A majority of our colleagues, withal, seek to sidestep the question. They hold that the City of Philadelphia's handling of Catholic Social Services (CSS) violates the Gratuitous Exercise Clause. But, they say, at that place's no "need" or "reason" to address the error of Smith today. Ante, at 5 (majority opinion); ante, at ii (BARRETT, J., concurring).
    ...
    It's not as if we don't know the right answer. Smith has been criticized since the twenty-four hours it was decided. No fewer than x Justices—including six sitting Justices—have questioned its fidelity to the Constitution. See ante, at 9–10 (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment); ante, at ane (BARRETT, J., concurring). The Court granted certiorari in this case to resolve its fate. The parties and amici responded with over 80 thoughtful briefs addressing every angle of the problem. JUSTICE ALITO has offered a comprehensive opinion explaining why Smith should be overruled. And not a unmarried Justice has lifted a pen to defend the decision. So what are nosotros waiting for?
    ...
    What possible benefit does the majority see in its studious indecision about Smith when the costs are so many? The particular appeal before us arises at the intersection of public accommodations laws and the Commencement Subpoena; it involves same-sexual practice couples and the Catholic Church. Perhaps our colleagues believe today's circuitous path will at least steer the Court effectually the controversial subject matter and avoid "picking a side." But refusing to requite CSS the benefit of what we know to be the correct interpretation of the Constitution is picking a side. Smith committed a constitutional error. Only we tin can fix it. Dodging the question today guarantees it will recur tomorrow. These cases will keep coming until the Court musters the fortitude to supply an respond. Respectfully, it should have washed so today. [11]

    		"
    —Justice Neil Gorsuch

    Text of the opinion

    Read the full opinion here.

    October term 2020-2021

    See also: Supreme Court cases, October term 2020-2021

    The Supreme Court began hearing cases for the term on October 5, 2020. The court's yearly term begins on the first Monday in October and lasts until the first Mon in October the following year. The court generally releases the majority of its decisions in mid-June.[13]

    The court issued 67 opinions during its 2020-2021 term. Ii cases were decided in one consolidated opinion. Ten cases were decided without argument. Click here for more information on the court's opinions.

    The courtroom agreed to hear 62 cases during its 2020-2021 term. Of those, 12 were originally scheduled for the 2019-2020 term but were delayed due to the coronavirus pandemic. Five cases were removed from the statement calendar.

    Come across also

    External links

    • Search Google News for this topic
    • Supreme Court of the United States - Fulton five. Metropolis of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
    • SCOTUSblog example file for Fulton 5. Urban center of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

    Footnotes

    1. ↑ ane.0 one.ane 1.2 1.3 ane.four 1.5 one.vi U.S. Supreme Court, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, decided June 17, 2021
    2. ↑ ii.0 2.1 Supreme Court of the U.s.a., "19-123 Fulton v. Philadelphia, PA," accessed February 28, 2020
    3. ↑ SCOTUSblog, "Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania," accessed Feb 28, 2020
    4. ↑ iv.0 4.1 four.ii 4.three four.four four.5 4.6 United States Courtroom of Appeals for the third Circuit, Fulton 5. City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, decided April 22, 2019
    5. ↑ Urban center of Philadelphia, "The Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance: Prohibitions Against Unlawful Discrimination, Affiliate 9-1100 of the Philadelphia Code," accessed February 28, 2020
    6. ↑ Pennsylvania Full general Associates, "Religious Freedom Protection Human activity," accessed February 28, 2020
    7. ↑ Cecilia Paul died while this action was pending.
    8. ↑ Cornell Law School Legal Information Establish, "Preliminary injunction," accessed Feb 28, 2020
    9. ↑ 9.0 nine.i 9.2 9.3 ix.4 Oyez.org, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, decided April 17, 1990
    10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.ii Justia, Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.South. 872 (1990), decided April 17, 1990
    11. ↑ eleven.0 xi.one 11.2 11.iii 11.iv Notation: This text is quoted verbatim from the original source. Any inconsistencies are attributable to the original source.
    12. ↑ Supreme Courtroom of the United States, "Oral Argument - Audio," accessed November nine, 2020
    13. ↑ SupremeCourt.gov, "A Brief Overview of the Supreme Court," accessed April 20, 2015

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